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TEMPERAMENTAL OR TRANSIENT AS A TESSERACT? 
ANALYZING PROCESS PATENT ELIGIBILITY POST-  
Dr. Johanna K. P. Dennis* 
In holding that the machine or transformation test was not the only way 
for processes to satisfy section 101 of the Patent Act, Bilski v. Kappos seemed 
to signal the potential for a broadening of patent eligible subject matter to the 
outer limits of abstraction. Since Bilski, in fact, we have seen a narrowing of 
what constitutes patent eligible subject matter via the Mayo/Alice test as it 
relates to computer technologies, business methods, and medical diagnostics, 
while the boundaries continue to remain unclear. This paper analyzes the 
landscape of section 101 eligibility through the post-Alice landscape by 
discussing the trajectory and evolution of process patents, assessing the 
prudence of recent attempts to deflect that path, and making 
recommendations for navigating a seemingly abstract arena. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
base of intellectual property law. Some of the primary ways that companies 
fund research and development are through growing and attributing value to 
their intellectual property portfolios, made up of clusters of rights to exclude 
others from using or licensing others to use parts and the whole of an 
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of Legal Writing at Golden Gate University School 
of Law. 
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innovation.1 Particularly, in patent law, the monopoly obtained tends to be 
even more valuable than in trademark and copyright2 contexts because the 
thing monopolized is the product of intellectual curiosity, research, and 
advancement.3 In trademark, we protect the mark, logo, or brand itself from 
use or dilution by others.4 
reputation of that with which it is affiliated. It has no other commercial value. 
 
thoughts and musings at a fixed point in time, as demonstrated in their 
5 In addition, copyright provides a 
restriction on the right to make subsequent derivative works from the 
copyrighted work. The value in copyright is not in the actual words on the 
pages, so as to prevent another from using those words or ideas to create other 
unrelated works. Nor is the value in trademark such that it prevents use of 
any and all of the independent parts of the mark in subsequent unrelated 
marks. However, patent rights do exactly this protect an invention6 by 
preventing others from using not simply the preferred embodiment of the 
whole, but any part of the patented invention, fully described in the patent. 
The ability to prevent another from using the idea described in one claim is 
vastly more powerful than most any power conceivable in either trademark 
or copyright. Thus, while in copyright we protect the tangible creation, and 
in trademark we protect the design of the creation, in patent we protect the 
ideas that give rise to the creation. 
But, this concept of protecting ideas is a formidable opponent. Ideas, 
thoughts, visualizations of steps and parts coming together are all intangible 
and abstract concepts. A patent need not be actually reduced to practice
for it to be 
 
1 See generally Thomas Gering, The Role of Intellectual Property (IP) in R&D-Based Companies: 
Setting the Context of the Relative Importance and Management of IP, EUR. COMM N DIRECTORATE-GEN. 
JOINT RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2004), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_iasp_ge_04/wipo_iasp_ge_04_8.pdf (discussing use of 
IP licenses to generate revenue); Masoud Vakili, Patent Portfolio Valuations-Importance of IP and 
Patents, IPWATCHDOG (July 12, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/12/patent-portfolio-
valuations/id=85409/ ( Intellectual Property (IP) is a crucial portion of a company s assets. Today, a great 
portion of the assets of Fortune 500 companies consists of intangible assets including intellectual 
property. ). 
2 See Vakili, supra note 1 ( Patents are in many cases the most important portion, especially in the 
high tech and biotech industries. ). 
3 Ideas  are arguably more valuable than tangible things that can be built with them, for one can 
use an idea to seed any number of final embodiments and even more ideas. Therefore, excluding others 
from using an idea  is a substantial barrier to that individual s ability to compete in the same business 
market. 
4 USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL 
REGISTRATION 2 (2019). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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protectable.7 Further, as we venture deeper into the twenty-first century, some 
of the types of innovations with great potential are also capable of posing 
great obstacles to future innovation.  
II.  DEFINING PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
Globally, the concept of granting patent monopolies to inventors for 
their innovations has required a showing of novelty, utility, and non-
obviousness (inventive step), notwithstanding how these terms have been 
couched.8 These three pillars are indisputably the hallmarks of innovation, 
yet different sovereigns have interpreted the same terms and concepts in 
different ways.9 Of the three, the determination of what is sufficient to 
constitute the requisite inventive step has been the most turbulent, generating 
more confusion and less predictability than could have been foretold. 
It would tend to seem straightforward that if someone develops a new 
way of solving an existing problem in society, that process would be worthy 
of patent. Generally, if this process had not previously been identified in 
relation to the problem, then it would be new, so as to satisfy the novelty 
requirement.10 Assessments of novelty generally involve addressing whether 
the claimed invention was truly discovered or merely identified from pre-
existing contexts, through comparisons with what is already known to what 
is claimed in the invention.11 As to utility, with the exception of innovations 
treading areas and concepts that particular sovereigns deem requiring a 
balancing of interests,12 or an assessment of usefulness as a patented product 
 
7 2138.05 PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), USPTO (2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2138.html#d0e207753.  
8 See Patents, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); World 
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions 
and Limitations to the Rights, at 2, SCP/13/3 (Feb. 4, 2009), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf ( [O]nly those [inventions] that meet the 
three patentability criteria, i.e., novelty, inventive-step (non-obviousness) and industrial applicability 
(utility) are entitled to patent protection so that only the inventions that contribute to technical progress 
are rewarded. ). 
9 See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject 
Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights, at 6 8, SCP/13/3 (Feb. 4, 2009), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf.  
10 See e.g., Jose Luis Reyes Villamizar, WIPO Sub-Regional Workshop on Patent Policy and Its 
Legislative Implementation, WIPO (2013), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/en/wipo_ip_skb_13/wipo_ip_skb_13_t10.pdf (slide on 
novelty). 
11 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). 
12 Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the OncoMouse, WIPO MAG. (June 2006), 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html [hereinafter Case of the 
OncoMouse]; Dennis Borges Barbosa & Karin Grau-Kuntz, World Intellectual Property Organization 
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as compared to usefulness in solving a problem, this is not often a high hurdle 
for the inventor to traverse. Third, inventors need to demonstrate that what 
they have claimed contains an inventive step and thus would not be obvious 
to someone in the field.13 Of these three, non-obviousness and novelty have 
been more perplexing when it comes to methods and processes.  
In other areas of law based in statutes when seeking a definition or 
guidance, interpreters turn to the statute itself, other contexts with similar 
structures, legislative intent, and then prior precedent. As to novelty, the 
statute itself provides some guidance, by i
body of technological knowledge known and available) should be 
considered.14 
underpinned the issue of patent eligibility. Similarly, as to non-obviousness, 
here the focus is on the differences between what is already known and the 
claimed invention to determine whether those differences are sufficient to 
render the content not obvious.15 On this score, case law runs far and wide, 
and several major hallmarks have transformed much of patent prosecution 
for methods and processes into a patent eligibility pursuit. The basic premises 
are that all patentable processes must be new else the very meaning of 
patentable processes must have a purpose 
or solve some identified problem, and that all patentable processes should 
advance the field by adding something more than what is already known to 
be there. What is an inventor if not someone who creates and contributes to 
their field? 
Arguably, the patent monopoly system does not seek to reward 
individuals for mere stenography or observation of existing biological or 
chemical processes. Nor does it seek to compensate for mathematical 
derivations, formulas, or algorithms, which form the computational basis of 
technological and physical arts. Both of these groups of processes are those 
which involve nothing more than asserting that which already exists, occurs, 
or results independent of the inventor. Thus, the universe of patentable matter 
16 limited by the 
caveat that the subject matter must also be eligible for patent. The 
determination of what is eligible and what is not has come down to an 
inclusion or exclusion analysis.17 Over time, the United States Supreme Court 
 
[WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights - 
Biotechnology, SCP/15/3, Annex III, at 30 35 (Jan. 1, 2010). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015). 
14 Id. § 102. 
15 Id. § 103. 
16 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
17 See Dennis Borges Barbosa & Karin Grau-Kuntz, supra note 12, at 6. 
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has determined that abstract ideas, mathematical formulas or algorithms, and 
laws of nature are not eligible for patent,18 while anything falling outside 
those categories is indeed eligible. 
As technology develops and we create methods of doing things more 
efficiently, more reliably, and more consistently, are those methods also not 
done less efficiently, unreliably, and with variable results without the aid of 
calculations, and humankind has known about systems of numbers for 
thousands of years? What then serves as the spark to encourage individuals 
to innovate, 
innovation is intentionally intangible and purposefully abstract, deliberately 
so because the intention is to replace human mental processes.19 These types 
substantial costs to innovate,20 but in light of the judicial exceptions to patent 
eligibility, there remains the question as to whether there is any patent 
monopoly to be gained from AI innovations. 
III.  OU DON T OWN ME  
There is no debate about ownership of the sun, the moon, and the stars. 
No one person or entity owns the naturally occurring cycles that give us rain, 
sleet, snow, or hail. These are owned by no one and all of us the same. This 
premise justifies the three judicial exceptions discussed herein, all of which 
relate to aspects which it is presumed are not capable of ownership. In 
economics, that scarcity makes a commodity more valuable is not an idea 
that one can prevent others from using to fix their prices based on data about 
resource availability. Similarly, in biology, notwithstanding the countless 
hours Mendel put into crossing pea plants, he would not have been able to 
prevent anyone from doing the same crosses to produce their own peas. 
This author previously argued that foundational research should not be 
patent eligible subject matter, on the basis of balancing usefulness as a 
patented invention against potential usefulness to the public at a reasonable 
 
18 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 86 (1981). 
19 See Artificial Intelligence  What Is and Why It Matters, SAS, 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html (last visited Mar. 29, 
2020). 
20 See, e.g., Nelson Cicchitto, What Is the Cost of Implementing AI Today?, AVATIER (May 9, 
2019), https://www.avatier.com/blog/what-is-the-cost-of-implementing-ai-today/; SAS Announces $1 
Billion Investment in Artificial Intelligence (AI), SAS (Mar. 17, 2019), 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/news/press-releases/2019/march/artificial-intelligence-investment.html. 
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cost, and on the basis of promoting further innovation through unfettered 
access to the building blocks of innovation.21 In terms of industrial-era 
machines, articles of manufacture, processes, and compositions of matter, the 
determination of where lay the pillars of research, such as to be excluded 
from patent protection, was generally a straightforward concept to apply. For 
example, it was commonly known and undisputed that the naturally 
occurring elements in the periodic table, which form the basis of all 
compositions of matter, are not patent-eligible subject matter because they 
on the jurisdiction, synthetic elements may be able to obtain patent 
protection22 and are patent-eligible subject matter. Similarly understood as 
beyond patent-eligible subject matter were raw mathematical formulas, 
algorithms, and laws of nature, which merely described series of steps that 
existed entirely independent of human intervention.  
In the context of the modern biotechnological era, these concepts were 
finding ways to pre-diagnose through genetics. Referring to the Harvard 
OncoMouse,23 perhaps the most famous of the first transgenic animals,24 this 
development was not 
constituted foundational research. Notwithstanding human involvement in 
integrating a recombinant activated oncogene sequence that triggered tumor 
growth into both germ and somatic cells of the mouse, it was not through 
human involvement that either mitosis or meiosis occurred growing the cells 
to become the stereotypical white lab mouse. These scientists should have 
been no more able to monopolize the mouse that developed independently 
than they could grass and weeds. Furthermore, as borne out in the range of 
 
21 See Johanna K.P. Dennis, Divergence in Patent Systems: A Discussion of Biotechnology 
Transgenic Animal Patentability and U.S. Patent System Reform, 1 INT L J. PRIV. L. 268, 268 303 (2008). 
22 See Element Patented for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1964), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/11/14/archives/element-patented-for-the-first-time.html (US patents to 
Americium-95 and Curium-96); Zack Mummery, International Year of the Periodic Table  Can a 
Chemical Element Be Patented?, REDDIE & GROSS (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.reddie.co.uk/2019/06/27/international-year-of-the-periodic-table-can-a-chemical-element-
be-patented/ ( A newly synthesised chemical element would not be excluded from patentability for being 
a discovery, at least in the UK and before the European Patent Office (EPO), because the new element 
would have been synthesised. ). 
23  Case of the OncoMouse, supra note 12. 
24 See, e.g., Jerry Adler, The First Patented Animal Is Still Leading the Way on Cancer Research, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/first-
patented-animal-still-leading-way-cancer-research-180961149/. 
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litigation about whether the mouse could be patent eligible,25 it was 
questionable for the U.S. to have allowed an application for patent26 to pass 
sought to be patented was a living being but for the gene, it was like all 
other beings of its kind
manufactured at all.27 Oncology, which focuses heavily on determining what 
treatments are effective on tumor cells, stood to benefit from a living test 
subject, upon whom treatments could be administered and effects measured 
by way of clinical trial as opposed to the limited scope of laboratory in vitro 
studies.28 Accordingly, a patent to the basis of that research would necessarily 
transform the laws of nature, here development of mammal germ and somatic 
cells into a being, from patent-ineligible to patent-eligible subject matter. In 
this sense, biotechnology and genetically engineered end-products, which 
 for research in medicine, 
pharmacology, and beyond, should have been viewed the same as other 
foundational patent-ineligible subject matter.29 
A quarter of a century after the Harvard OncoMouse was patented in the 
US, the patent eligibility issue came full circle when the US Supreme Court 
recognized that the core foundation of genetic research is naturally occurring 
genes and DNA sequences which are not patent-eligible subject matter, while 
synthetically or human-created sequences could be patented.30 One could 
make the case that because the OncoMouse only grew into a creature through 
naturally occurring biological processes, it remained a mouse and thus 
patent-ineligible subject matter.  
There is also a key 
research, such as genes on the micro- -level 
and the manner in which lab researchers introduced chemicals and cells to 
 
25 The Harvard OncoMouse was patented in the U.S. (US Pat. No. 4,736,866) in an application 
referencing non-human mammals. It was eventually allowed by the European Patent Office after a lengthy 
inquiry and amendment of the application limited to transgenic mice. See, e.g., T 0019/90 (Onco-Mouse) 
of 3.10.1990, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-
appeals/recent/t900019ep1.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). Meanwhile, the Canadian patent office 
rejected the OncoMouse patent application on the basis that higher life forms were not patentable.  
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.R. 45 (Can.). 
26 The first patent to the OncoMouse was granted in 1988 in the United States. U.S. Pat. No. 
4,736,866.  
27 See Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.) (stating 
that the OncoMouse was not an article of manufacture). 
28 See also Case of the OncoMouse, supra note 12 (EPO s analysis concluded that the usefulness 
of the OncoMouse in furthering cancer research satisfied the likelihood of substantial medical benefit, and 
outweighed moral concerns about suffering caused to the animal. ). 
29 See Dennis, supra note 21, at 286.  
30 See Ass n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).  
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31 While the naturally occurring genes and mice are 
foundational to developing therapies and treatments, a strong argument may 
be made that the specific analyses and trials conducted to either stimulate or 
suppress cell development should be both patentable and patent eligible as 
these me
scientific knowledge and resources, but their creativity and imaginations.32 
Of similar less-disputed genre are the resulting medicines compositions of 
matter derived from the processes themselves. However, the current state 
of the law pertaining to patent eligibility has operated to invalidate some 
innovations and draw into question others in the realm of what a mere decade 
ago would have been accepted as protectable research innovations and 
creative business methods.33 An analysis of how our system has come to this 
point and where we are headed is warranted. 
IV.  BACKGROUND ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
Over the history of patent law, no one statute has caused so much 
consternation as has 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of 34 Section 
101 of the Patent Act was intended to be broad in scope35 to allow for a large 
range of potential innovations. In listing the four categories within it, the 
and such will be patent eligible. The provision only provides a basis that these 
are the classifications of patentable innovations. To pass the gauntlet into the 
 
31 See Dennis, supra note 21, at 279; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 577. 
32 See also Myriad, 569 U.S. at 596, 595 (There were no method patents at issue in this case, nor 
did the case involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  
The Court noted that [h]ad Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching 
for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent. ). 
33 See Robert P. Greenspoon, Congress  Section 101 Fix Would Create a 112(f) Problem, 
IPWATCHDOG (May 28, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/28/congress-section-101-fix-
create-112f-problem/id=109766/ (The Courts recent rulings catastrophically undermine[] and 
invalidate[] important patents that, until then, protected breakthrough inventions. ). 
34 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2020). 
35 See Daniel T. Taskalos, Returning to the Status Quo? Proposed Outline for Section 101 
Reform, NAT L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/returning-to-status-quo-
proposed-outline-section-101-reform ( Section 101 only recites broad categories of patent-eligible subject 
matter. ); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER REFORM IN THE 
116TH CONGRESS (Sep. 17, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45918.pdf; see also 2111 Claim 
Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation, USPTO (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html (During patent examination, the pending claims 
must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. ). 
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patent monopoly, the innovation must also be eligible for patent as based on 
the existing legal system. 
Section 101 was relatively untouched for much of the over 200-year 
history of the Patent Act. Over the past 47 years, the Supreme Court has 
reshaped the image of patent eligibility for processes and business methods, 
starting in 1972 with Benson.  
In Gottschalk v. Benson,36 in discussing a patent involving a 
mathematical formula in conjunction with a digital computer, the Supreme 
Court held that since the formula had no practical application outside of the 
computer, i.e., served no purpose except when integrated or run on a digital 
computer, allowing a patent to the computer using the formula would be in 
fact a patent to the formula itself. This kind of patent would be stifling to 
research, as allowing one inventor to hold control over the computer-formula 
combination would mean all others would not be able to develop any 
technology deriving from the formula either since they could not do so 
without using a computer.  
Then, six years later, in Parker v. Flook,37 the Court again addressed 
formulas and determined that claims in a patent were not patent eligible nor 
these claims, it would proceed as if the principle or formula were well-
known. This essentially rendered every conceivable algorithm, whether or 
-
the Court views as patent ineligible.  
Three years later in Diehr,38 the Court provided some hope by its 
were not the same as concepts themselves.  
Even so, at the end of this body of cases, we had solidified the judicially 
created exceptions to patent eligibility as being laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas. 
 As such, it has come to be known that the official position is that section 
d; laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas have never been 
patentable.39 It should be noted there is nothing written into section 101 
 
36 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
37 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). 
38 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 211 (1981). 
39 We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.  Ass n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 02 (2010); 
O Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853). 
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providing for any limitation at the patent-eligibility threshold based on 
 
One argument for why these aspects should be excluded is that mankind 
does not invent that which fundamentally exists outside of his intervention
both of which true laws of nature and natural phenomena do. There then 
remain abstract ideas, which in the world before artificial intelligence would 
tend to require the thought by an individual, as an idea was not thought to be 
something that could exist apart from the human mind.  
What remained murky is where an idea surpasses being merely abstract 
so as to permit patent and the right to exclude all others from its use. On this, 
patentees, patent practitioners, and Courts have seemed to drift rudderless in 
search of Treasure Island, with tests eluding and articulating where this line 
is.40 Furthermore, the very purpose of AI is often to replace that which we 
would do with our own minds. Thus, we train AI machines to recognize 
and the possibility that all of that work 
may not provide any monopoly could serve as a disincentive to innovation.41 
V.  RECENT TRAJECTORY 
A.  Refining the Exceptions 
Since Diehr, the U.S. patent system from the U.S. Patent and 
ns
consistently lagging behind it.  
Prior to 2010, the test used to determine whether a process was patent 
concrete, and tangible result 42 This result-oriented test articulated by the 
Federal Circuit in 1998 ruled the roost and provided a predictable means of 
evaluating how to navigate office actions, until the Court stepped in for the 
first time since Diehr, allegedly to clarify the scope of patent eligible subject 
matter. What came next threw the door wide open on what types of things 
could be patent eligible.  
 
40 See, e.g., Angelo J. Bufalino & Christopher P. Moreno, The U.S. Supreme Court s Ruling in 
Bilski v. Kappos: Hedging Against Bright-Line Rules, NAT L L. REV. (Sep. 4, 2010), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-court-s-ruling-bilski-v-kappos-hedging-against-
bright-line-rules. 
41 See, e.g., Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589 ( [P]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between 
creating incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery  and imped[ing] the flow of 
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention. ). 
42 See St. Street Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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In Bilski v. Kappos, the Office and the courts were faced with a matter 
involving a business method patent that had disclosed a method for hedging 
against price-fluctuation risk in the commodity markets.43 Ultimately at all 
levels, from the PTO through to Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, the 
patent was found not to be patent-eligible as it recited a fundamental 
economic principle.44 While invalidating the patent, the Supreme Court 
restructured the analysis for assessing whether a process or business method 
was patent eligible. While some patents may fall neatly within either a 
machine or a transformation, the test the Federal Circuit had adopted for use 
below,45 according to the Court, those were not the only ways that these 
patents could be patent eligible.46 And that was it.  
What were the other ways? Bilski
confusion and laid groundwork for the need for the Court to re-explain these 
boundaries, if any. In a combination of cases shifting the patent eligibility 
test even further from its roots in State Street,47 the Court articulated a two-
step test that focuses on spotting the 
patent. 
First, in 2012, the Court turned t
to address patent eligibility in Mayo v. Prometheus Labs.48 In so doing, it 
took account of all three of its own preexisting judicial exceptions, which had 
hitherto focused only on business methods, and the mathematical algorithm 
and abstract ideas exceptions discussed in their prior cases, to fashion a 
suitable test for medical diagnostics. One significant aspect of Mayo was this 
extension of the judicial exceptions framework previously applied to 
business methods, now into medical technologies. 
Subsequently, in Mayo v. Prometheus Laboratories, the claims read to 
a method of administering a drug, checking and determining concentration 
of a metabolite, and then based on that measurement, making a decision as 
to dosage. The core of that process lay in the biochemical relationship 
 
43 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593. 
44 Id. Further, in Bilski, the PTO and CAFC had rejected as unpatentable a method of determining 
and balancing risk, such as weather-related risks, in commodities trading.  See Johanna K.P. Dennis, 
Redux on the Process  of Patenting and the U.S. Supreme Court s Consideration of Bilski?, 2010 
TEMPLE J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL L. 1, 1 (2010). Separate from the tests discussed by the Court, some have 
stated that by all accounts and under any test or analysis the claimed invention was unpatentable. See id.; 
Johanna K.P. Dennis, The Process  of Patenting: Why Should We Care About a Potential U.S. Supreme 
Court Decision in Bilski v. Doll?, 25 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 543 53 (2009). 
45 In Bilski, the State Street test was rejected by CAFC and instead replaced with a two-pronged 
test either a machine or a transformation was required to demonstrate patent eligible subject matter. 
The Supreme Court affirmed that this was one test  but not the only test and this became the new normal. 
46 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.  
47 St. Street Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1368.  
48 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
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between concentration of one thing and the effect it would have on another. 
In finding the claims patent ineligible, the Court held that these steps
a were not enough to overcome the 
presumption of patent ineligibility triggered when a claim fell within a 
judicial exception. We previously knew from Flook that claims reading to 
calculations, and thus measurement, would not survive a challenge on the 
basis of judicial exception.49 Instead of being viewed as a distinct method
and one which may, in fact, have surpassed the State Street , concrete 
the claims asserted were rejected as the types of 
things scientists do in labs on a routine basis, while determining dosage based 
on the effect of a drug on a patient is routine in the practice of medicine. 50 
While recognizing that to some degree all inventions involve in some 
way laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas, the Court created 
from whole cloth a two-part test for determining patent eligibility.51 To 
engage in the analysis about whether an invention was patent ineligible due 
to a judicial exception, in what may seem like an obvious first step, but one 
the Court articulated as necessary, the claims must focus (individually or 
collectively) on either a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract 
idea. If a judicial exception is triggered, then the analysis turns to being able 
to identify and isolate what aspect above and beyond the exception is present 
in the claims.52 This step-two search, also known as the search for the 
inventive step, has been the bane of many a patent pra
 
By this point, hope for a clear framework for business method patent 
eligibility was but a pipe dream, given that the new framework articulated in 
 Bilski
away from a test that involved 
some aspect of goalposts, albeit with a catch-all third category, to a test that 
involved a more subjective barometer. Just 
language foreshadowed more to come, this new test in Mayo in the medical 
diagnostics context cried out to be cloned into business methods. This Alice53 
did. 
Alice so closely resembled Bilski that, notwithstanding the industry 
reaction to Alice as a gamechanger, an argument could be made that Alice did 
nothing more than rei Bilski 
as the test that applications for processes and methods that seek to patent 
 
49 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).  
50 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72.  
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 79. 
53 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
2020] Temperamental or Transient as a Tesseract? 245 
an abstract idea and nothing more will never be patentable.54 Perhaps the 
patent community should have been on notice from then. While Bilski 
involved a method for avoiding or minimizing against risks of price 
fluctuation,55 Alice involved mitigation of risks in settlement via a neutral 
third party.56 Both involve principles in economics,57 and absent any 
intervening change in the law or new test announced by the Court, one might 
have predicted that the patents in Alice would have been found patent 
ineligible just as was the case in Bilski.58 
Accordingly, two years post-Mayo, when faced with the patents in Alice, 
the Court extended the Mayo two-step test to business-method patents, while 
indicating an intent to permit patents involving a judicial exception only 
exception itself.59  
In both Mayo and Alice, the emph
integrating into something more, transforming into something more, 
performing something more and determining whether the additions recited 
Notwithstanding this repeated emphasis on 
  the Court provided little direct instruction in what is 
Given the extent to which the Court describes 
while expressly 
delimit the precise contours of the abstract ideas  
category,  one can only assume that the Court did not intend to provide a 
 
54 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).  
55 Id.  
56 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 208. What was at issue, here, was the concept of ensuring that both 
parties to an agreement would pay or perform their obligations through having a trusted third party  
verify payment or performance of both parties before any consideration was released to either party. In 
Alice, the claims involved a major concept in economics i.e., using an intermediary to assess or mitigate 
risk. Using a computer, without more, does not render the concept inventive  where the core remains the 
idea itself. For instance, while the idea of adjusting cost based on supply and demand is a basic one in 
economics and, therefore, a method described that involves a computer gauging and reporting the volume 
of demand, comparing with available supply of vendors for a product, and then using an algorithm 
adjusting the cost to be charged, would not be patentable. Such a method does not describe anything other 
than already known concepts in economics and business. 
57 Just like in Bilski, the claims in Alice read to risk management methods, and specifically, a 
computerized scheme for mitigating settlement risk.  Id. at 213. Just as Bilski involved a third-party 
intermediary, so too did Alice. The claims in the four patents at issue were designed to facilitate the 
exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party 




settlement, Id. at 220. 
59 Id. at 225 27. 
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bright-line or create a predictable test.60 Having started out with the 
pronouncement of the judicial exceptions on a clean slate and now having a 
test articulated as purposefully non-restrictive, over the past four decades, the 
Court seemed to have come full circle with respect to articulating the ways a 
patent application for process or method may escape or fall within the judicial 
exceptions. 
B.  The Legal Aftermath  
In other areas of U.S. law, when the rules change in such a way as would 
be a detriment to some, they are only applied prospectively, in the interests 
of notice and predictability, with ex post facto laws being generally 
discouraged.61 However, in patent law, when the rules change as to patent 
eligibility, even though inventors could not have been on notice of not yet 
created rules, restrictions, or their implications, their inventions may be 
subjected to invalidation,62 which does not trigger ex post facto concerns, 
since it is not the passage of a law but a determination that the patent was 
invalid at inception or is invalid under current law. In one sense, this is 
defensible; the stakes in allowing a patent to an innovation public 
disclosure at the price of exclusive and enforceable rights to monopoly are 
quite high. It should follow then that at any given time, society would only 
want those rights to be enforceable by people whose innovations are, as of 
that moment, recognized as within the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. 
Instead of a static patent system, changing laws and reassessment of the scope 
of patentability renders the system dynamic and responsive to the changes in 
technology and one where enforceable monopolies reflect current scientific 
knowledge. 
 
60 Id. at 221. 
61 See U.S. CONST. art I, §§ 9, 10. 
62 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2019); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2019) (infringement actions may be brought 
anytime during patent term, and since invalidity is a defense to infringement, then invalidity proceeds may 
also be bought any time during the term of a patent); see also Inter Partes Review, UNITED STATES PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last modified May 9, 2017); Post Grant Review, UNITED STATES 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/post-grant-review (last modified May 9, 2017); Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity Avenue to 
Take: Inter Partes Review Verses Post-Grant Review, IPWATCHDOG (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-invalidity-avenue-ipr-verses-post-grant-
review/id=99460/; Shruti Mehta, Alternative Pathways for Challenging Patent Validity in the US, IQVIA 
(May 2, 2019), https://www.iqvia.com/blogs/2019/05/alternative-pathways-for-challenging-patent-
validity-in-the-us. 
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Unsurprisingly then, in the wake of Alice, there has been extensive 
activity at all levels involving process patents,63 which had been predicted in 
64 in addition to hefty criticism 
from the patent community.65 First, there was a substantial amount of 
litigation; more than 7,000 decisions have cited Alice in only five years 
(2014 2019),66 averaging over 1,400 cases each year. In the same time frame, 
over 6,000 decisions in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have cited or 
otherwise relied on Alice. Alice has definitely won the middle school 
popularity contest. As would be expected, the substantial volume of these 
cases (all but 140) is in the federal district court, where infringement claims 
are raised and invalidity proceedings end up after agency reexamination and 
appeal. In almost every case, at some point in district court, the alleged 
infringers file dispositive motions (e.g., motions to dismiss the claim of 
infringement or motions for summary judgment in their favor), asserting that 
the patent(s) are invalid due to being drawn to patent-ineligible subject 
matter.  
These motions are usually denied because they address patent validity 
at an early stage in the litigation. 67 On a motion to dismiss, where there is a 
grant the motion and dismiss the 
complaint.68 Similarly, on a motion for summary judgment, the court should 
grant the motion where there are no genuine issues of material facts as to a 
threshold issue such as patent eligibility.69 Alice -step analysis has 
 
63 See, e.g., Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the Line as 
Supreme Court Eyes IP, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (2016), 
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/News/Law360%20(The%20Battle%20for%20Patent%20Law_%20
OQuinn)%20July%202016.pdf. 
64 CLS Bank Int l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting) 
( [I]f all of these claims, including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of 
hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents 
as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents. ). 
65 See, e.g., Taskalos, supra note 35 ( The relative fluidity of patent eligibility jurisprudence since 
the Court s decision in Alice has caused difficulties not only for potential inventors and industry, but also 
for the patent bar at large. ). 
66 As of January 24, 2020, there were 7,401 federal court opinions citing Alice. Of these 125 were 
from the Federal Circuit, which though comparably few, still constitutes an average of 25 opinions each 
year or one opinion every two weeks. 
67 See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Puma N. Am. Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174359, at *7 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(motion to dismiss denied); see also CardioNet, LLC v. ScottCare Corp., No. 12-2516, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 173622 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2017) (motions to exclude evidence and testimony of expert witnesses 
as to infringement and non-infringing alternatives, which could have determinative effect for one or 
another side, were denied). 
68 See supra note 67.  
69 When there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether[, for example,] the claim 
element or claimed combination is well-understood, routine, [ and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the 
relevant field, this [Section 101] issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.  
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created an inroad for defendants to seek application of Alice earlier and 
earlier in proceedings seeking judgment in favor of the alleged infringer; in 
some cases, alleged infringers have found filing dispositive motions at the 
district court level effective.70  
Meanwhile, there have been just over 100 decisions from the Federal 
Circuit in that same time, which is even still a substantial number, since it 
suggests a rate of twenty appellate decisions involving similar Alice issues 
each year.  
Three post-Alice cases in the Federal Circuit have helped to provide 
lusive patent court 
views Alice. The Federal Circuit grappled with identifying where step one of 
the Alice inquiry ended and where step two began. It has also attempted to 
triggering judicial exceptions.71 Among these decisions, DDR Holdings,72 
Enfish,73 and Electric Power74 are notable. 
First, the court laid groundwork for the potential to excise itself from 
the entanglements of the Mayo/Alice test, by isolating only those cases where 
it need venture past step one into step two. For those cases where the inquiry 
ends at step one, the court need not dance with Alice.  
In Enfish,75 the court found the claims were patent eligible because they 
fell outside step one as neither laws of nature, natural phenomena, nor 
abstract ideas. As the Federal Circuit put it, claims directed to an 
 
S.I.SV.EL. Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo Dell  Elettronica S.p.A v. Rhapsody Int l Inc., No. 18-69-MN-
CJB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37508, at *12 13 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2019) (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 
881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018)) (granting defendants  motion for summary judgment as to 202 
patent) (alterations in original). But see S.I.SV.EL v. Rhapsody Int l Inc., No. 18-69-MN-CJB, 2019 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 39305 (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2019) (denying defendants  motion for summary judgment as to 
123 patent because of conflict between testimony by plaintiff s expert and defendant s expert regarding 
whether the ordered combination in the claims demonstrated novelty). 
70 See, e.g., Tele-Publishing, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 17, 27 28 (D. Mass. 2017) 
(granting motion for summary judgment on the basis of finding claims to be drawn to an abstract idea in 
Alice step one and failing to contain an inventive step in Alice step two); Smart Software, Inc. v. 
PlanningEdge, LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 243, 249 50 (D. Mass. 2016) (granting defendant s motion to 
dismiss because the patent fails to provide the necessary inventive concept  in Alice step two); Zkey 
Invs., LLC v. Facebook Inc., 225 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1155 59 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (granting motion for 
summary judgment to alleged infringer based on Alice step two). But see Zak v. Facebook, 206 F. Supp. 
3d 1262, 1264 65 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment on basis of demonstrating 
an inventive step in Alice step two). 
71 See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green 
Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
72 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (upholding validity 
of computer-implemented patent claims after Alice). 
73 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
74 Elec. Power Grp., LLC. v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
75 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1691 92. 
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improvement of, not in addition to, computer functionality are not in and of 
themselves abstract ideas under step one. One could argue that there is a very 
fine line between an addition to an invention and an improvement of the 
invention, given that often improvements involve additions and some 
additions operate to improve. Nonetheless, here the Federal Circuit escaped 
from grappling with Mayo/Alice, while reaching a positive outcome for the 
patent holder. 
By comparison, in DDR Holdings,76 the court danced the two-step, 
finding that the patents did indeed read to patent eligible subject matter. 
There, the matter indisputably put the court on the dance floor there was an 
abstract idea of how hyperlinks work coupled with connections and coding 
on the back end, not visible to the user.77 Yet the court found the claims patent 
traffic. Of significance to the court was that the claims 
described a proc
to achieve a result responsive to a particular problem. By contrast, claims 
involving use of computers will necessarily fail Alice step two where they 
78 
79  
Third, and by contrast, in Electric Power, the patents described and 
claimed real-time performance monitoring and were found to be patent 
ineligible under the test.80 
concepts, the court pushed the analysis into step two.81 The claims failed there 
the particular field and the claimed processes being indistinguishable from 
re excluded from 
section 101. Electric Power is concerning for AI innovations exactly because 
82 If more efficient improvements and ways of performing 
ordinary mental processes by use of computer technology are not patent 
then quite a bit is at stake at being excluded from patent protection. Problems 
 
76 DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1255. 
77 Id. at 1257. 
78 Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
79 Id. at 1325 (quoting Alice, 572 U.S. at 225).  
80 Elec. Power Grp., LLC. v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
81 Id. at 1353 54.  
82 Id. at 1355. 
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arise in creation of AI systems and innovations created by them, where what 
the patent application truly is seeking to protect is a function of mathematics, 
statistics, and data, as it relates to a particular industry. There, it may truly be 
novel but the applicant will butt up against the existing case law on judicial 
exceptions and certainly Mayo/Alice. In these instances, both in and outside 
of AI, it is to be expected that a large majority of business methods that are 
grounded 
something unconventional and nonroutine from that data will be patent 
ineligible under the guise of being themselves the building blocks of business 
strategies of tomorrow. 
With this volume of litigation in such a short timeframe, there is some 
concern that the current Mayo/Alice test is unclear, confusing, and difficult 
to apply.83 This translates into the concern, notwithstanding the ability to 
retrain and develop new strategies,84 that where there is uncertainty, 
application of the test would similarly be unpredictable.85 In this industry, 
allegations of uncertainty tend to skew towards predictions of rejections of 
pending applications and invalidations of already-issued patents, in either 
case increasing the dockets pertaining to section 101 challenges. 
C.  Agency Adaptation 
The patent community has generally opined that as the legal landscape 
has shifted, purportedly in response to changes in technology, inventors and 
patent practitioners have struggled to adapt prospective and existing process 
applications and defend issued process patents from invalidation. Some go 
so far as to say that changes in defining patentable processes have had a 
negative effect on research and development as evidenced by the volume of 
patent applications, issued patents, and invalidity proceedings, particularly in 
terms of patents involving implementation on a generic computer.86 
 
83 See also Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent Court 
Wreaking Havoc on Patents (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-v-
prometheus-lawless-decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ (criticizing Mayo and Alice). 
84 See, e.g., Charles Bieneman et al., How to Practice Patent Law After Alice, HOLZER PATEL 
DRENNAN (Feb. 2012), http://hpdlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/How-to-Practice-Patent-Law-
After-Alice.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Lara Cartwright-Smith, Patenting Genes: What Does Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Mean for Genetic Testing and Research?, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 289 
(2014) (discussing confusion/lack of clarity in health and medicine after Myriad Supreme Court). 
86 See, e.g., Decoding Patent Eligibility Post-Alice, FENWICK & WEST, 
https://www.fenwick.com/pages/post-alice.aspx (last updated Oct. 17, 2019) (displaying graphic showing 
comparison of upheld and invalidated cases and bases for each decision, through Oct. 2019); Chart of 
Post-Alice Cases, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Overview-of-Section-101-Patent-Cases-Decided-After-Alice-v-CLS-as-of-03-
01-19.pdf. 
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However, while the Patent and Trademark Office has certainly issued a 
number of guidance documents and reports addressing section 101 
examination,87 in response to changes in the law and particularly after Alice,88 
as a forward-thinking society, we should be encouraged by a dynamic and 
responsive patent agency. It certainly makes it more difficult for patent 
practitioners to keep up when there are multiple Guidance documents 
describing how examiners will assess patent eligibility for processes within 
the same calendar year.89 These changes reflect that the Office is self-
reflective, evaluating, assessing, and revising its practices as it learns from 
its own outcomes. There is no requirement of a set schedule for issuing new 
documents as it sees fit and necessary should result in greater certainty that 
patents that issue from the office in the wave of new Guidance documents 
responsive to Alice are less likely to be threatened or invalidated than if fewer 
clarifying memos and documents had been provided. 
Some argue that immediately after Alice we saw an immediate drop in 
the number of business-method patents being allowed, as demonstrated by a 
drastically different rate of Allowance Per Office Action (APOA) as 
compared to pre-Alice, and that fact is indicative of it being more difficult to 
get a patent through to allowance in the post-Alice world.90 This author 
submits that an immediate decline in allowances is exactly what one should 
expect when a test is changed, particularly if the applications that had been 
pending at that time were filed and being examined using an altogether 
different structure. No patent application is filed, examined, and allowed on 
the same day. Thus, when both Mayo and Alice were decided, the applications 
pending at those times would have been filed with prior tests in mind. Once 
charged with applying the new tests and provided Guidance via the agency, 
examiners would look at their pending patent applications and ascertain 
 
87 See Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-
regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility. 
88 Taskalos, supra note 35 ( Since the Alice decision, the USPTO has issued new guidance 
regarding how patent examiners are to analyze claims under section 101 at least once a year, with the 
exception of 2017. As many practitioners would attest, the application of the guidance can vary between 
examiners and art units, resulting in general confusion as to what exactly makes one claim patent eligible 
over another. ). 
89 For instance, the October 2019 Guidance replaced the January 2019 Guidance. 
90 See Mark Nowotarski, Business Method Patents Recover Under USPTO Guidance, 
IPWATCHDOG (May 19, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/19/business-method-patents-
recover-uspto-guidance/id=109307/ ( [A]llowances per office action (APOA) dropped from 17% before 
the 2014 Alice decision to 4% right after the Alice decision . . . . APOA rose to 17% in 2019 after the new 
2019 Guidance came out in January, [which is] . . . its pre-Alice level. ) Allowances per office action 
h the applicant responds prior to receiving an 
allowance. Therefore, an APOA of 1/5 (~20%) means that an applicant is likely to receive an allowance 
after 5 prior office actions. By comparison, APOA of 1/20 (~5%) means that the applicant will likely face 
20 office actions (a sum that is impracticable) prior to an allowance, translating into very few allowances. 
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which already met the new test thresholds and predictably many would not. 
Given that the new test would take some time for practitioners to integrate, it 
should not have been a shock when there were many rejections immediately 
after Alice.  
What is more indicative of the difficulty level of prosecuting a process 
or business method patent post-Alice is the current rate of Allowances Per 
Office Action (APOA). Sufficient time has elapsed since Alice that patents 
more recently allowed were more likely to have been filed with inventors and 
practitioners in full knowledge of the Mayo/Alice framework. These 
applications certainly would have been examined using that framework and 
the various Guidance documents provided to examiners by the PTO. And 
thus, the current APOA (2019) which is identical to the pre-Alice APOA is a 
better indicator as to whether it is more difficult to prosecute a process or 
business method patent in the Office. When viewed through this lens 
factoring in time and revision of office practices, this author suggests it is 
neither more difficult nor less so to obtain an allowance  
D.  What the Future Holds: The Legislative Lion? 
It is an understatement to say that the industry was displeased with the 
Mayo/Alice test.91 With many patents being invalidated, since as mentioned 
above, they would not have been prosecuted with that test in mind, it should 
come as surprise to absolutely no one that industry would lobby for anything 
that could result in unearthing Mayo/Alice.92 Accordingly, with pressure from 
stakeholders,93 Congressional activity through 2019 was plentiful. Of major 
significance is that which was largely unseen a draft bill proposing patent 
reform, that aimed in part to amend section 101. The formal bill stalled 
initially due to disagreements about the proposed amendment to section 
112(f) and the interplay between sections 101 and 112,94 and later due to 
 
91 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).  
92 See, e.g., Taskalos, supra note 35 ( The impetus for such reform stems from uncertainties in 
recent case law regarding what qualifies as patent-eligible  subject matter since the U.S. Supreme Court s 
holdings in Mayo Collaborative Services, DBA v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice 
Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). ). 
93 Eileen McDermott, Draft of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects Patent Owner Input, 
IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-
section-101-reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ (Range of comments and reactions on the draft bill, 
including Hank Johnson: Section 101 of the Patent Act is foundational to the patent system, but recent 
court cases have upset what should be solid ground. ). 
94 Anthony J. Fuga, Bloomberg Law: There Is a Lack of Consensus Among Stakeholders on Patent 
Eligibility Reform, HOLLAND & KNIGHT SECTION 101 BLOG (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://www.hklaw.com/es/insights/publications/2019/10/bloomberg-law-there-is-a-lack-of-consensus-
among-stakeholders. 
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95 Given the potential for uptake of this 
issue in a future Congress,96 the draft that was released and the discussions in 
hearings97 are illuminating as to the ideas floated and discussed between the 
Subcommittee and stakeholders.  
In the draft bill released in May 2019, section 101 would have included 
the following language: 
The provisions of section 101 shall be construed in favor of 
eligibility. 
No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject 
laws of 
patent eligibility under section 101, and all cases 
establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are 
hereby abrogated  
The eligibility of a claimed invention under section 101 shall 
be determined without regard to: the manner in which the 
claimed invention was made; whether individual limitations 
of a claim are well known, conventional or routine; the state 
of the art at the time of the invention; or any other 
considerations relating to sections 103, 103, or 112 of this 
title. 98 
Of critical significance is that the language in this bill would have sought 
to explicitly remove the judicial exceptions from the determination of patent-
eligibility, effectively vaporizing decades of case law and raising questions 
 
95 In early 2020, Senator Thom Tillis, Chair of the Senate s Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property, noted that the Subcommittee is not against patent eligibility reform, but all stakeholders [need] 
to work with Senator Coons and [him] to develop a consensus driven approach.  Short of this, according 
to Tillis, the Subcommittee would not be [able to] complet[e] its work on legislatively addressing patent 
eligibility  due to the reasonable concerns that have been expressed about the draft as well as the practical 
realities of the difficulty of passing legislation . . . in this Congress.  Michael Borella, The Zombie 
Apocalypse of Patent Eligibility Reform and a Possible Escape Route, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2020/02/the-zombie-apocalypse-of-patent-eligibility-reform-and-a-possible-
escape-route.html. 
96 Id. (Based on Sen. Tillis  statements, it appears that patent eligibility reform is in an undead 
state ostensibly alive but not currently breathing. ). 
97  April 17, 2019: release of bipartisan bicameral framework  for reform of section 101. Press 
Release, Thom Tillis, U.S. Senator (April 17, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-and-
coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework. May 22, 
2019: Draft bill released; June 2019: Public hearings; Formal Bill was announced as expected in 
September or October 2019. However, 2019 ended without introduction of the bill into Congress. 
98 This draft bill was provided to many stakeholders and thus is written about and found on a 
number of private websites. As a Senate proposed bill, but not yet formally introduced or numbered, the 
only government site where it could be reasonably located was the Senate website s file. SENATE.GOV, 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/E8ED2188-DC15-4876-8F51-A03CF4A63E26 (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2020). 
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as to retroactivity to pending applications and recently allowed patents, or 
only prospective filings.99 
that which is written either in the Constitution or in statutes created by 
and harmony between the different sub-branches, and the foundational 
documents. For these systems to work, while there may be times when one 
ctify the actions of another, there is also a 
level of trust and respect necessary and that all are acting with the best 
interests of the nation at hand.  
While some have argued in support of proposals that abrogate 
Bilski/Mayo/Alice,100 there are other ways to achieve the goal of broadening 
the scope of patent eligibility, if that is what Congress so chooses to do, 
without discarding a virtual library of precedent and replacing it with a 
vacuum.101 In other situations where Congress has sought to respond to 
judicial outcomes, it has chosen to pass amendments or new statutory 
provisions stating more clearly how it intends for the matter to be resolved. 
This approach considers all we know and all we can foresee, not by asking 
what should have been done, but by focusing on what the law should be in 
light of our present and foreseeable knowledge. However, contrary to this 
informed forward-looking perspective, proposals like the draft bill which 
support abrogation of Bilski/Mayo/Alice purposefully rest Office Actions of 
tomorrow on a foundation from a prior era, based on an implicit assertion that 
our patent eligibility jurisprudence permitted broader discoveries when we 
knew less. These proposals would have patent prosecution of today
technologies evaluated based on language formulated at a time when 
humankind knew a microscopic fraction about innovation of what we now 
know. When prosecuted through that framework, almost everything would 
be patent eligible102 which may in fact have the opposite effect than that 
the volume of patented processes increases, and companies have increased 
(though potentially patent invalid) options for development. This shifts the 
 
99 It should be noted that as per Article I, Section 9 and Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress and the states are prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. If this bill were to become law, 
some would argue that it could only apply prospectively and could not operate to revalidate/reopen already 
invalidated patents.  
100 See, e.g., Borella, supra note 95 (proposing that we should (i) let § 101 reform happen, 
abrogating Alice, Mayo, and essentially all § 101 jurisprudence since the 1952 Patent Act, so that there 
are no more ill-defined judicial exceptions, and (ii) allow rapid, limited-scope, pre-discovery motions for 
claim invalidity in district courts. ).  
101 Greenspoon, supra note 33 ( Alice was an interpretation of Mayo, which was an interpretation 
of Flook, which was an interpretation of Benson, which was supposed to be an interpretation of what 
Congress meant by the short and crisp statement of Section 101 of the Patent Act. But just as a photocopy 
of a photocopy of a photocopy gets more distorted with each generation, so did Supreme Court rulings. ). 
102 Id.  
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burden of examination from a corps of science, technology, and engineering 
examiners in the Patent Office to a wide array of district court judges from 
different backgrounds with varying levels of experience and exposure to the 
complex underpinnings of patent law. Moreover, it leaves the judiciary to 
sort the wheat from the chaff by addressing patent eligibility solely in 
motions, greatly increases the stakes in pre-trial motion practice, rests undue 
and possible excessive weight on expert testimony, and risks overwhelming 
the district courts with unnecessary litigation. Moving one complication into 
another branch defers the analysis; it does little to resolve the issue at the 
core what should be eligible for patent? 
If Congress seeks to amend the Patent Act, and in particular address 
that mission, and it should not dial back from that responsibility by offloading 
it elsewhere in the pipeline. At present, one criticism of the Mayo/Alice test 
is that it is so vague that it makes potentially everything and nothing patent 
eligible, which is actually as broad and flexible as the Court intended for it 
to be. Should Congress eventually pass legislation that removes all 
guideposts from patent eligibility, the threshold for patent eligibility of 
innovations would also be so broad as to render everything and nothing patent 
eligible. As such, the patent community stands to be in no better a situation 
than the current one by removing these goalposts, as bitter as they taste, 
heads in the dark against every Tom, Dick, and Harry with a patent, relying 
entirely on firm and consistent application of the other sections of the Patent 
Act and uniform and consistent testimony and judicial decision on motions 
across 94 districts to invalidate or block the true overbroad applications and 
patents.103 The power to correct the ambiguity by revising the language in 
expected of it by the Constitution. It is imperative that Congress itself come 
together, engage with stakeholders, and make the difficult decisions in 
recognition that it is impracticable to expect an outcome on reform that 
satisfies all the desires of all parties, but it is not impossible to create a 
solution that provides a clearer path. 
VI.  SO, WHAT NOW? 
Society and the patent community need to continue to take active roles 
in determining what they want the process patent landscape to look like. At 
all levels, it is important to recognize that as technology advances the 
determination of what is foundational is going to become a more complex, 
 
103 Id.  
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higher baseline e.g., when we knew little, then much more simple 
technology was the foundation, but the more we know, the thicker and more 
advanced the foundation for it is. It logically follows that we would not want 
to limit access to the foundation, since doing so threatens to impede the 
wheels of progress. One problematic aspect of deferring too much to the 
judiciary to interpret technology-based aspects of law is that the continual 
change of tests for patent eligibility continues to result in the invalidation of 
a patent to an innovation that was fairly allowed and novel under the test of 
its time but fails under a test of the future. This retroactive effect in patent 
invalidity proceedings exists even though applying legislative provisions 
retroactively is disfavored when doing so would impair a substantive right.104  
One plausible means of addressing process patent invalidity solely 
based on retroactive application of a judicial interpretation or test would be 
to implement a graduated invalidity scheme. For those patented innovations 
th
be provided with a notice period, followed by a step-down approach to the 
rights afforded from the patent grant. This would have less harsh results than 
immediate invalidation. In one iteration of this model, particular claims in a 
patent that were validly allowed at the time issued, but fail to pass a future 
test for patent eligibility could carry a one-year notice period, during which 
the innovation is compulsory licensed or otherwise contractually shared with 
public research institutions and entities, and after the notice period being 
freely available to all. 
It is difficult to predict how a future Court will interpret section 101 and 
the existing tests, and this temperamental unpredictability complicates patent 
prosecution and for companies can make it difficult to recoup Research & 
Development costs without scattershot patent filings in the hope something 
sticks longer term. If this retroactive and thereby by definition unpredictable 
variation in patent validity on section 101 is unpleasant to Congress and 
various stakeholders, then Congress needs to uphold its duty and continue to 
work to devise a statutory structure that 
better encapsulates what threshold process patents must pass in the world of 
2020 and beyond.  
The outcomes discussed herein are not to say that companies cannot use 
economic principles, data and statistics, or medical diagnostic processes to 
further their businesses and gain success over competitors, nor that 
companies have no means to keep competitors from using the same models 
 
104 See e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324-25 (2016) (discussing Constitutional 
restrictions on retroactive legislation); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) 
( [R]etroactivity is not favored in the law,  and its interpretive corollary that congressional enactments 
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this 
result. ). See also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610-12 (2003) (discussing Ex Post Facto laws). 
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and methods, or to protect their R&D. It may be that for some types of 
medical processes and business methods, the particular type of bargain 
achieved by patent a monopoly for a term of years in exchange for open 
and public disclosure may not in fact be the best vehicle for protecting the 
intellectual property. In some circumstances, it may be that the process or 
method should not be restricted in any way from the public. For example, 
when it comes to protecting mass public health, morality and public welfare 
claims satisfied this or that test. Here, there is a defensible argument that 
based on best interests for society, the immediate invalidation of any patent 
that no longer meets the test of the time is necessary. 
In other situations, inventors and researchers may opt to engage in 
explicit contractual relationships or collaborations for sharing of methods for 
periods of time, thus working towards a common goal using resources and 
technology beneficial to both. Further, it is conceivable that trade secrets may 
be of use in protecting some types of business method innovations and that 
for others, securing a copyright may be a more lucrative option. However, in 
the realm of patents, for the immediate future subject to bills to come, the 
Mayo/Alice test is bread and butter.  
While the patent community may be understandably frustrated with 
cycles of Court interventions and transient tests, the solution is not to abolish 
four decades of carefully laid precedent. We would be no better off with a 
stagnant and uninvolved Supreme Cour not 
while the pace of innovation already outpaces our active federal judiciary
just as we are not better off with a Congressional body which abandons the 
task because it is too difficult. Quite to the contrary, the patent laws will be 
more meaningful with both the judiciary and the legislature taking active 
roles in ensuring that the rules and tests reflect the general intention of the 
era and the parties involved in process patent eligibility discussions will need 
to compromise for there to be meaningful patent reform.105 Any reform to the 
standards for evaluating process patents for section 101 eligibility must yield 
an analytical framework that is both temperamental and transient, so that it is 
responsive to growing technology and not perceived by inventors or 
practitioners as a fixed, rigid structure. In the meantime, as long as it is the 
concomitant variability in the Mayo/Alice test will require more careful, 
deliberate, and thoughtful process patent claim drafting and prosecution in 
contemplation of potential alternate tests, and an eye to the future for agency 
Guidance documents and possible legislative action in an upcoming term.  
 
 
105 See Borella, supra note 95.  
